We study revenue maximization through sequential posted price mechanisms (SPMs) in single-dimensional settings with n buyers, and independent but not necessarily identical value distributions. We construct our SPMs by considering two simple pricing schemes: one that imitates Myerson's mechanism via taxation principle, and the other that posts a uniform price. We design a factor revealing LP that crisply captures the approximation factor of this SPM. In the H-unit setting, our SPM yields the first improvement in approximation over the correlationgap-based approximation factor from over eight years ago Yan (2011). In the position auction setting, our SPM yields the first higher-than 1 − 1/e approximation factor. In the 1-unit setting, our SPM yields better than the current best known approximation factor for small values of the number of buyers n. Our results on SPMs immediately imply improved performance guarantees for the equivalent free-order prophet inequality problem. In the recent surge of results that show an improvement over 1 − 1/e for SPMs, ours is the only technique that generalizes beyond the 1-unit setting, and yields the first improvement over long established approximation factors in several settings.
Introduction
The focus of this paper is a deeper study and understanding of Sequential Posted Price Mechanisms (SPMs), and, proving improved revenue approximation factors for SPMs w.r.t. the optimal mechanism in many single dimensional settings. In a general single dimensional setting, there are n agents/buyers with independent but potentially non-identical value distributions, and a feasibility constraint on which set of agents can be simultaneously served. A SPM computes one price per buyer, and approaches buyers in the descending order of prices, making take-it-or-leave-it offers of service at the posted price. Running a SPM to determine allocation and payment satisfies numerous desired properties, making them objects of both wide practical relevance and scientific interest. We refer the reader to Chawla et al. (2010a) for some of the benefits of running SPMs, including trivial game dynamics, buyers not having to reveal their private values in full, seller not having to assemble all buyers together to decide allocation/payment etc.
The seminal work of Myerson Myerson (1981) and a generalization by Archer and Tardos (2001) established the revenue optimal mechanism among all possible Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC), and Interim Individually Rational (IIR) mechanisms. This optimal mechanism is a wonderful conceptual vehicle, but rarely used in practice due to its complex structure and strong dependence on buyer value distributions. When one is forced to run a more natural but sub-optimal mechanism like SPM, one of the primary questions of interest is to lower bound the fraction of optimal revenue that a SPM can obtain. The first approximation factor for SPMs was established by by Chawla et al. (2010a) , who show that SPMs obtain a 1 − 1 e fraction of the optimal revenue, i.e., a 1 − 1 e approximation factor. Since the result of Chawla et al. (2010a) , the same 1 − 1 e approximation or, more generally, the 1 − (1 − 1 n ) n approximation, where n is the number of buyers for SPMs was found to be obtainable with various techniques including pipage rounding (Calinescu et al. 2011) , correlation gap (Agrawal et al. (2012) and Yan (2011) ). The first improvement over this 1 − (1 − 1 n ) n bound was achieved recently by Azar et al. (2018) , who show how to improve 1 − (1 − 1 n ) n to 1 − 1 e + 1/400 for n ≥ 74, while still staying at 1 − (1 − 1 n ) n for smaller n. This was later improved by Correa et al. (2019b) to a 0.669 approximation factor. Both Azar et al. (2018) 's and Correa et al. (2019b) 's works apply for the more general setting where buyers arrive according to a uniformly random permutation, rather than in the sellers chosen order. But they all apply only to the single-item setting.
In this work, we improve the correlation-gap generated approximation factors in Yan (2011) for the first time since 2011 for many single-dimensional settings beyond the 1-item setting. Even for the 1-item setting which has seen significant recent interest resulting in bounds that beat the correlation-gap generated 1 − 1 e factor (i.e., Azar et al. (2018) , Correa et al. (2019b) ), our work gives the best approximation factors to date for small values of number of buyers n: in fact our approximation factor is higher than the best known bound of 0.669 for all n ≤ 10, which is often the more relevant regime: see Table 1 (the last row for ESP is explained in the next page). For the H-items setting, we beat the correlation-gap generated factor of 1 − H H H!e H , and the exact factor we obtain for different values of H is in Table 2 . For the position auction setting, even a 1 − 1 e approximation was not known prior to this work, and we give a 0.6543 approximation factor. For a general matroid setting, our work gives an alternate set of prices to achieve the 1 − 1 e approximation from Yan (2011) . We leave beating 1− 1 e factor for general matroids as an open question, and believe that the techniques from this work could be of use in doing this. n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 − (1 − 1/n) n 1.0000 0.7500 0.7037 0.6836 0.6723 0.6651 0.6601 0.6564 0.6536 0.6513 SPM 1.0000 0.7586 0.7168 0.6990 0.6891 0.6828 0.6785 0.6753 0.6728 0.6709 ESP 1.0000 0.7611 0.7210 0.7040 0.6946 0.6887 0.6846 0.6815 0.6792 0.6774 Table 2 : The second row presents the best-known bound for the multi-unit setting prior to this work, and the third row shows our improved bound for H ∈ [10] . Approximaton factors are applicable for all values of n.
Overview of technical approach, novelty and significance
The central technique in our proof is to identify two natural SPMs such that one complements the other: i.e., when one of them performs poorly in terms of revenue, the other is guaranteed to get a good revenue. The first of these SPMs is an optimal mechanism inspired posted-price mechanism, which computes the taxation-principle prescribed posted prices for each buyer: the taxation principle says how to interpret any mechanism as a posted-price mechanism, except that the posted-prices are correlated as they are also a function of other agents values. But in our SPM the prices across agents are independent because while determining the price for each agent, we resample the values of other agents. The second of these SPMs is one that posts a uniform price across all buyers. We show that these two SPMs complement each other well.
Building on the conceptual understanding that we obtain about the two different SPMs complementing each other, we write a novel factor revealing LP whose objective is the optimal mechanism's revenue and whose constraints are that each of the SPMs above has a revenue of at most 1 (we can always assume revenue is upper bounded by 1 by scaling). The resulting LP lends itself to a clean solution, directly yielding the approximation factor.
We highlight the generalizability and simplicity of our approach: the conceptual understanding we obtain about the two SPMs indeed forms the heart of all the results. As a further demonstration of the generalizability, we show that the second price auction with eager reserve prices (ESP) can also be directly analyzed using our two-SPMs plus factor revealing LP technique. While Chawla et al. (2010a) show that an ESP that uses a SPM's prices as reserve prices always obtains weakly higher revenue than the SPM, no technique was known earlier to separate ESP from SPM and make it obtain higher revenue. We use our factor revealing LP technique to achieve this, resulting in strictly increased approximation factor for ESP. Detailed derivation and proofs are in Appendix F.
While the high-level structure of the proofs all follow the same simple outline described above, relating the variables of the optimal mechanism (appearing in the objective of the LP) to the variables of the SPM (appearing in the constraints of the LP) is quite technically challenging in the H-units setting, yielding neat combinatorial lemmas along the way (for example, Lemma 5 where we relate the taxation principle based SPM's revenue to optimal mechanism's revenue).
As for significance of these results, we note two points. First, for many single-dimensional settings, this is the first result that goes beyond the factor directly obtained from correlation gap Yan (2011) and for the position auction environment even a 1 − 1 e factor was not known earlier. Beating the known factor necessarily required a deeper understanding of SPMs than using a blackbox hammer like correlation gap. Second, the improvements we obtain are significant in light of how frequently these auctions are run: for instance, the ESP auction is run several billions of time each day by ad exchanges to allocate display ad slots.
Free-order prophets and second price auctions: Due to the work of Correa et al. (2019a) it follows that all approximations we get for posted-price mechanisms directly apply to the prophet inequality setting where we are allowed to pick the order of random variables (free-order prophets). The approximation improvements in eager second price auctions (ESP) was discussed earlier.
Organization: While the closely related work has already been discussed, broader related work is discussed in Appendix A. Section 2 formally introduces the model, Section 3 discusses the singleunit case, Section 4 the H-units case, Section 5 uses the H-units result to derive results for position auction and partition matroid environments, and also discusses the general matroid setting briefly. Several proofs are relegated to the appendix. The proof of improved approximation for ESPs (strictly improved comapred to SPMs) is presented in Appendix F.
Model
In this paper, we study single-unit, multi-unit, matroidal, and position auction settings. In this section, we describe the mechanisms for the matroidal setting, which includes the single-unit and multi-unit settings. The description of position auctions is given in Section 5.
Buyer Valuations: There are n buyers indexed by i ∈ [n], where [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}. The buyer i has a private value v i for getting one unit of the item being sold, where v i is drawn independently from a publicly known distribution F i with density function f i . All the buyers demand at most one unit of the item.
General Feasibility Constraints: Let F be an arbitrary collection of subsets of [n]. If the mechanism is constrained to have the set of all buyers receiving an allocation to be a set in F, then F is the feasibility constraint of the mechanism. Feasibility constraints that we study include:
• Single-unit Setting: F is the collection of n singleton sets and the empty set. This models the setting where the mechanism has just a single item to sell.
• Multi-unit Setting: F is the collection of subsets of [n] of size at most H. This models the setting where the mechanism has H units to sell.
• Matroidal Setting: F is the collection of subsets of [n] that are independent sets of a matroid. The single-unit and H-units cases are special cases of a matroid. See Section E for a formal definition of matroid.
Notation: For matroidal settings, the sequential posted price mechanism is denoted by SPM M (p). Here p = (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n ) is a vector of posted prices in SPM M (p). For the special case of H-units setting, we use SPM H (p). When H = 1, i.e., for the 1-unit setting, we drop the subscript H. Throughout the proof, with a slight abuse of notation, we denote the expected revenue of SPM M (p) also by SPM M (p), where the expectation is taken with respect to the randomness in the buyers' value.
Sequential Posted Price Mechanisms SPM M (p) -Buyers are sorted in decreasing order of their posted prices p i , i ∈ [n]. Without loss of generality, we assume that p 1 ≥ p 2 ≥ . . . ≥ p n .
-The mechanism approaches buyers in decreasing order of their posted prices. If adding buyer i to the already allocated set S of buyers satisfies the feasibility constraint, i.e., if S ∪{i} ∈ F, the mechanism offers price p i to buyer i. If the buyer accepts the offer, i.e., v i ≥ p i , buyer i will be allocated to and charged a price of p i , and S is updated to S ∪ {i}. Otherwise, the mechanism proceeds to buyer i + 1.
Optimal Revenue Benchmark
Our benchmark, which we refer to as Opt M (we drop the subscript when it is clear from the context), is an incentive-compatible (truthful) and individually rational revenue-optimal auction in the independent value setting. This mechanism was designed by Myerson (1981) . For most of our results, the specific form of the optimal auction is irrelevant. We will use only the fact that it is a deterministic truthful auction, and hence, the taxation principle (Hammond 1979) gives a simple equivalent form of expressing such a mechanism. Even when the distributions are not regular, Myerson's mechanism can be implemented as a deterministic mechanism; see Myerson (1981) and Chawla and Sivan (2014) . By taxation principle (see Appendix B for details), given any deterministic truthful mechanism M in any one-dimensional private-value setting with arbitrary feasibility constraints (including single-unit, multi-units, matroids, position auctions), there are threshold functions t i (v −i ) for each buyer i, depending only on the bids of the other buyers v −i = (v j ) j =i , such that buyer i with v i > t i (v −i ) is a winner and pays t i (v −i ).
Definitions and Notations
Thresholds: In the rest of the paper, t i (v −i ) refers to the threshold of buyer i corresponding to the optimal auction for the feasibility constraint under study (see Lemma 12). Whenever it is clear from context, we abbreviate t i (v −i ) or the function t i (·) by t i .
Re-sampled thresholds: We will often refer to the thresholds computed from independently resampled values: namely, for each buyer i, sample v j,i ∼ F j for all j = i, and denote by
. . , v n,i ). Observe that we do not reuse samples: for each buyer i, we freshly re-sample the values of all other buyers. We abbreviate t i (v −i ) by t i whenever it is clear from the context. Note that although for each i, the distribution of t i is the same as the distribution of t i , the t i 's are independent across i's while the t i 's are correlated.
Myersonian Posted Prices: This refers to the tuple of n (random) posted prices, one per buyer consisting of the re-sampled threshold t i for buyer i. Note that as one would expect the thresholds depend on the feasibility constraint: this is because the optimal mechanism (the Myerson's mechanism) depend on the feasibility constraints F.
Uniform Posted Price: This refers to the highest revenue yielding uniform posted price. For the 1-unit SPM setting, this is given by, p = arg max p p · P[max i v i ≥ p]. For the H-units setting, the uniform price is given by p = arg max p p · E[min (|S p 
, be the probability that buyer i wins and pays at least τ in the optimal auction (which depends on the feasibility constraints F), where the probability is taken w.r.t. v −i and v i . Further, let s(τ ) = i∈[n] s i (τ ) be the probability that the winner pays at least τ . It follows immediately that s(τ ) is a weakly decreasing function whose integral defines the optimal auction's revenue:
3 Single-unit setting
In Section 3.1, we provide a universal bound (valid for all n) for SPMs. Section 3.2 presents n-dependent bounds.
Sequential Posted Price Mechanisms for Single-unit Settings
In this section, we derive an approximation factor for the SPMs that holds for any value of the number of buyers n. We note that our approximation factor is valid even if value distributions are not regular. For the case of H = 1 that we study in this section we drop the H subscript and denote the mechanism by SPM(p).
Theorem 1 (Revenue Bound of SPM). In a single-unit n-buyers auction with independent buyer valuations, there exists a vector of prices p = (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n ) such that SPM(p) ≥ 0.6543 · Opt, where Opt is the expected optimal revenue and SPM(p) is the expected revenue of an SPM with prices p.
Let MP denote the expected revenue of Myersonian posted price mechanism, where the expectation is taken w.r.t. randomness in both the re-sampled posted prices and the buyers' values. As a warm up, we first show that MP ≥ (1 − 1 e )Opt. Define m(τ ) as the probability that the Myersonian posted price mechanism sells with a price of at least τ , which is the probability that there is at least one buyer with v i ≥ t i ≥ τ . By invoking Inequality (11) in Lemma 15, we get m(τ ) ≥ 1 − e −s(τ ) ≥ (1 − e −1 )s(τ ) . Integrating this expression, we get that:
We prove Theorem 1 by showing that max(UP, MP) is at least a 0.6543 fraction of the optimal revenue, denoted by Opt. This implies that there exist prices p = (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n ) such that SPM(p) ≥ 0.6543 · Opt ≈ (1 − 1 e + 0.022)Opt. The fact that the best of Myersonian and uniform prices obtains an approximation factor better than 1 − 1/e shows that Myersonian and uniform pricing rules complement each other. This is so because as we show in the following, Myersonian SPM cannot obtain an approximation factor better than 1 − 1/e. Consider the setting where there are n buyers whose values are independently drawn from the uniform distribution in [1, 1 + ] for a tiny . Then, the optimal auction is simply the second price auction with a uniform reserve of 1, and the uniform pricing scheme that just posts a price of 1 gets very close to this optimal auction. However, in the Myersonian posted price mechanism, each buyer is offered a random threshold that is the maximum of n − 1 uniform variables. Thus, each buyer is above such a threshold with probability 1/n. Since they are all independent, with probability (1 − 1/n) n → 1/e, no buyer is above the threshold. Thus, MP just makes a 1 − 1/e approximation for this particular choice of prices. As stated earlier, for this example, the uniform price performs well.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1 by constructing a factor revealing LP: the proof immediately follows from Claim 2.
Claim 2 (Detailed Statement of Theorem 1). The maximum of Myersonian posted price mechanism's and uniform posted price mechanism's revenue is at least Opt LP-SPM = 0.6543 · Opt, where LP-SPM is defined as
and, f (τ ) = 1−e −x x . Proof. Proof of Claim 2 We first show that max(MP, UP) ≥ 1 LP-SPM Opt. Subsequently, we prove that 1 LP-SPM = 0.6543. Without loss of generality, assume that the revenue of the SPM that chooses the best of uniform and Myersonian prices is normalized to 1: i.e., max(MP, UP) = 1 (this can be done by scaling all values). The proof shows that the function s(·) corresponding to the optimal Myerson solution of a properly scaled problem is a feasible solution to LP-SPM. In light of this, the objective function of LP-SPM provides an upper bound on the optimal revenue (see Equation (1)). To complete the proof, in the following, we show that s(·) satisfies the constraints of Problem LP-SPM. The last set of constraints, i.e., the monotonicity condition, is obviously satisfied by s(·). Thus, we focus on the first and second sets of constraints.
Upper Bounds on UP (First Set of Constraints): By Lemma 3, it is obvious that s(·) satisfies the first set of constraints. Note that this lemma presents an upper bound on UP as a function of s(·).
Lower Bounds on MP (Second Constraint): Here, we show that s(·) satisfies the second set of constraints. Let m(τ ) be the probability that the Myersonian posted price mechanism sells with a price of at least τ . Then, we have:
where the inequality follows from max(MP, UP) = 1. By Inequality (11) in Lemma 15, we have
where f (x) = 1−e −x x . The first inequality follows from 1 − x ≤ e −x . Invoking Inequalities (2) and (3) leads to the second constraint in LP-SPM.
Solve the LP: Next, we compute the objective value of LP-SPM. It is not difficult to guess the optimal solution of Problem LP-SPM. Since by the last set of constraints of Problem LP-SPM, σ(τ ) is (weakly) decreasing in τ and f (σ(τ )) is decreasing in σ(τ ), we have f (τ ) is increasing in τ . Thus, the optimal solution must satisfy that σ(τ ) = min(1, 1/τ ) whenever τ ≤ τ and σ(τ ) = 0 when τ > τ . where τ > 1 is the unique threshold for which ∞ 0 σ(τ )f (min(1, 1/τ ))dτ = 1. This leads to
By solving the above equation numerically, we get τ = 1.696, and the optimal solution to the LP is given by
Hence, the SPM that chooses the best of uniform and Myersonian pricing rules yields at least 1/1.5283 ≈ 0.6543 of Opt, which is the bound in Theorem 1.
Lemma 3. Consider the optimal revenue of in the single-unit auction, given in Equation (1), and let us assume that the revenue of the SPM that used the best of Myersonian and uniform prices is normalized to one. Then, for any τ > 0, we have
Proof. Proof of Lemma 3 Consider the SPM that posts a uniform price of τ for every buyer. The revenue of this mechanism is equal to τ · P[max i v i ≥ τ ], which is at least τ s(τ ). Therefore, the revenue of the SPM with the uniform price of τ is at least ≥ τ s(τ ) for every τ ≥ 0; that is,
where the second inequality follows from the fact that the revenue of the SPM that used the best of Myersonian and uniform prices is normalized to one. Inequality (5) leads to 0 ≤ s(τ ) ≤ min(1, 1/τ ) for any τ ≥ 0, which is the desired result.
We note here that in the H-units setting (presented in Section 4), the result in Lemma 3 can be generalized in a straight-forward manner as follows:
Improved Results in Single-unit Setting for a Small Number of Buyers
The bound presented in Theorems 1 holds for any number of buyers n. In online advertising markets, due to targeting and the heterogeneous preferences of buyers (advertisers), the number of buyers is rather small. Inspired by this fact, in this section, we obtain improved bounds for the SPMs when the number of buyers n is small. We use similar ideas as in Theorem 1 to get these improvements (see Table 1 ). The proof of the new approximation bounds is given in Appendix C.
In Figure 1 , we illustrate our improved bounds for the SPMs. We also depict the best-known bound for these mechanisms prior to this work, i.e., 1 − (1 − 1/n) n . As stated earlier, this bound stems from the work of Chawla et al. (2010a) . We observe that our bound for the SPMs improves the prior bound by up to 3%. Further, the revenue bounds increase as the number of buyers decreases. Figure 1 : Comparing our bound with the best prior known bound for n = 2, . . . , 10. The blue dashed curve presents the bound in Theorem 1. Recall that this bound is valid for any n ≥ 1.
Multi-Unit Setting
In this section, we show that our pricing rule as well as our proof technique generalizes to multiunit settings. Specifically, we assume that there are H ≥ 1 identical units of an item and n unitdemand buyers. Similar to the previous section, valuation of buyer i ∈ [n] for getting allocated is independently drawn from distribution F i where distributions are public knowledge. SPM in Multi-unit Settings: The description of SPM for the general matroidal setting was already presented in Section 2.
The following is the main result of this section.
Theorem 4 (Revenue Bound in Multi-unit Settings). In a H-units n-buyers auction with independent buyer valuations, there exists a vector of prices p = (p 1 , p 2 , . . . ,
where Opt H is the expected optimal revenue in a H-units setting, SPM H (p) is the expected revenue of a posted price mechanism with prices of p, and LP-SPM(H) is defined as
. Furthermore, our bound is greater than the best-known bound prior to this work. That is, Table 2 in the introduction presents our improved bound and the best-known bound for the multi-unit setting prior to this work, which is 1 − H H H!e H (this was the previously-obtained bound via correlation gap (Yan 2011)) .
Observe that when H = 1, the bound in Theorem 4 is the same as that in Theorem 1. The proof of Theorem 4 is presented in Section D.2. To derive the bound in Theorem 4, we focus on designing a pricing rule for the SPM. Specifically, we evaluate the performance of the SPM that chooses the best of Myersonian and uniform prices. To do so, we show that function s(·) corresponding to the optimal Myerson solution of a properly scaled problem is a feasible solution to Problem LP-SPM(H); see Equation (1). Precisely, we first derive an upper bound on the revenue of the SPM with uniform price, where this upper bound leads to the first set of the constraints in Problem LP-SPM(H). We then establish a lower bound on the revenue of the SPM with Myersonian prices as a function s(τ ).This lower bound leads to the second constraint in Problem LP-SPM(H). Establishing this lower bound, which is presented in the following lemma, is the main challenging part of the proof.
Lemma 5 (Lower Bound on Myersonian SPM's revenue in Multi-unit Settings). Consider the H-
Then, m(τ ), which is the expected number of units that the SPM with Myersonian prices sells with a price of at least τ , satisfies the following inequality.
We present the proof of Lemma 5 in Section D.1. In this lemma, we express m(τ ) in the form of n-degree polynomials with O(n H ) terms and n variables, and by carefully grouping the terms in the polynomial, we show the polynomial is minimized when all of its variables are equal. Showing this gives us the desired inequality.
Theorem 4 also establishes that our bound 1 LP-SPM(H) is strictly better than the best-known bound prior to this work, i.e., 1 − H H H!e H . To show this result, in Lemma 6, we first characterize LP-SPM(H):
Lemma 6 (Characterizing LP-SPM(H)). Consider any positive integer H > 1. Let τ > 1 H be the unique solution of the following equation
Then, LP-SPM(H), defined in Theorem 4, is given by 1 + ln(Hτ ).
The proof of Lemma 6 is presented in Section D.3. In the proof, we use the following lemma in which we show for any positive integer H,
is decreasing in x. We note that showing this monotonicity result is a non-trivial task because of the combinatorial
We provide the proof of Lemma 7 in Section D.4. We then show that ln(Hτ * ) < H H H!e H . This inequality and Lemma 6 ensure that
H!e H , confirming our bound beats the best-known bound prior to this work.
Position Auction, Partition Matroids, and General Matroids Settings
The improved bounds of multi-unit auctions lead to improved approximations for position auctions and partition matroids settings. We also explore to what extent our technique can be applied to general matroids. While we are not able to obtain improvements over 1 − 1/e for general matroids, we show that the Myersonian prices can be used to obtain an alternative SPM that is a 1 − 1/e approximation. We provide the improved approximations for Position Auctions in the next subsection. The partition matroid and general matroid approximations are provided in Appendices E.2 and E.3.
Position Auctions
Position auction (PA) setting capture the allocation constraints in search advertisement (Athey and Ellison 2011, Varian 2007) . In this setting, there are n positions characterized by click-throughrates α 1 ≥ α 2 ≥ . . . ≥ α n and n buyers with private value-per-click equal to v 1 , . . . , v n , where v i is independently drawn from distribution F i . If buyer i is allocated to position j and charged payment π i in expectation of clicks, then his expected utility will be u i = α j v i − π i . Note that we will describe the mechanism in terms of expected payment π i and not payment per click. If a buyer is allocated x i clicks in expectation and is charged π i , this is equivalent to charging him π i /x i per click. An auction for the PA setting elicits bids from buyers and returns a (possibly randomized) allocation from buyers to positions and an (expected) payment for each buyer. Let A be the set of all feasible allocations from buyers to positions. Allocation a ∈ A is feasible if no more than one buyer is assigned to a position, and no buyer is assigned to more than one position. Further, allocation a can be represented by J i (a), i ∈ [n], where J i (a) is the position that buyer i is assigned to under allocation a. Any direct mechanism M can be described by its allocation and payment rules that we denote by (y, π), where y : R n → [0, 1] |A| and π : R n → R n . Here, y a (v) is the probability that allocation a is chosen and π i (v) is buyer i's payment given buyers' reportv. Then, a direct mechanism is truthful if buyer i prefers to reveal his true value; that is,
as the expected number of clicks of buyer i when he reportsv i and other buyers are truthful. Then, the mechanism is truthful if for any
Observe that the truthfulness condition is expressed as a function of the expected number of clicks and payments. Given this, one may want to describe a mechanism in the PA settings as a mapping between a vector of values v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) and expected clicks x(·) and payments π(·). But, there is a caveat: For a given vector of expected clicks x, there may not always exist a randomized allocation. To make it clear, consider the following example. Assume that n = 2 and let α 1 = 1 and α 2 = 0.5. Then, there is no randomized allocation that results in the expected clicks of x = (0.8, 0.8). This is so because i∈ [2] x i exceed the total available click-through-rates, i.e., i∈[2] x i > i∈[2] α i = 1.5. Lemma 1 in Feldman et al. (2008) nicely generalizes this observation and provides necessary and sufficient conditions under which a vector of expected clicks is feasible.
Lemma 8 (Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Feasibility of Expected Clicks). In a PA setting with click-through-rates α 1 ≥ α 2 ≥ . . . ≥ α n , a vector of expected clicks x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is feasible, i.e., there exists a randomized allocation y ∈ [0, 1] |A| such that x i = a∈A y a α J i (a) for any i ∈ [n], if and only if the following inequalities are satisfied:
As pointed out in Feldman et al. (2008) , constructing randomized allocation y for any valid vector of expected clicks, is closely related to the classical scheduling problems, which are studied in Horvath et al. (1977) and Gonzalez and Sahni (1978) . For more details, see Feldman et al. (2008) .
Lemma 8 allows us to describe a (truthful) PA mechanism as a mapping between a vector of values v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) and expected clicks x and payments π such that for any v, the expected clicks satisfy Inequalities (7) . With that in mind, in the following, we first present the optimal auction for the PA settings. In particular, we show that the optimal auction can be expressed as a function of the allocation and payment rules of the optimal auction in the j-unit setting with the same valuation distributions, where j ∈ [n]. Inspired by that, we then present an SPM for the PA settings that builds on our proposed SPMs for the j-unit setting; see Section 4. As our main result, we show that our SPM for the PA settings obtains a 0.6534-approximation to the optimal auction revenue. While 0.6534 is a universal bound for any click-through-rates, we obtain an improved bound of n j=1 f j /LP-SPM(j), where f j is the fraction of the optimal auction revenue that can be attributed to position j (to be precisely defined later) and 1/LP-SPM(j) is the approximation ratio proved for our SPMs in the j-unit settings.
Next, we characterize the optimal auction. For j ∈ [n] and i ∈ [n], let x j i (v) ∈ {0, 1} and π j i (v) ∈ R + be the allocation and payments in the optimal j-unit auction when buyers' value is
for every buyer i, and as a result, there is a position J i such that x j i (v) = 1 for any j ≥ J i and zero otherwise. This is so because in the j-unit optimal Myerson auction, items are allocated to at most j bidders with the highest nonnegative (ironed) virtual values. Thus, if a buyer i is allocated in the j-unit optimal auction, he is also allocated in the j -unit optimal auction, where j > j. Now, consider the following auction in PA settings that assigns position J i to buyer i; that is, the buyer gets the expected click of
. The next lemma shows that this auction is indeed optimal in the PA settings.
Lemma 9 (Optimal Auction in PA Settings). For j ∈ [n] and i ∈ [n], let x j i (v) ∈ {0, 1} and π j i (v) ∈ R + be the allocation and payments in the j-unit optimal auction when buyers' value is v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ). Then, the auction for the PA settings with the following rules is optimal:
where α n+1 = 0.
This lemma allows us to view an auction for the PA setting as a combination of the multi-unit auctions. It provides the following decomposition of optimal auction revenue:
where the expectation is w.r.t. buyers' value. Note that the j-th term is the contribution of the j-unit auction, i.e., j-th position, to the total revenue. Precisely, we define
as the fraction of the optimal revenue that can be attributed to position j ∈ [n].
SPM for the PA Settings: Motivated by the structure optimal auction in Lemma 9, we propose the following SPM: For each j = 1, . . . , n, we run the SPM with the best of Myersonian and uniform prices for j-unit settings as described in Section 4.
, be the outcome of the SPM in the j-unit settings. That is,x j i (v) is one if buyer i gets an item in the SPM for j-unit setting, and zero otherwise. Furthermore,π j i (v) is buyer i's payment in that auction. We then definẽ
as the expected number of clicks and the expected payment of buyer i in the SPM for the position auction when buyers' value is v. At first glance, it may not be obvious that the described mechanism is an SPM for the PA settings. But, in fact, the mechanism can be explained as an SPM with n 2 prices. Let p j i be the best of Myersonian and uniform prices for buyer i in the SPM with j units. Then, for each position j = 1, 2, . . . , n, we approach buyers sequentially in a decreasing order of their prices p j i , and offer them the expected number of clicks of (α j − α j+1 ) at the price of p j i (α j − α j+1 ). We stop when either j buyers accept our offer or we approach them all.
One can think of (α j −α j+1 ) as the extra clicks that a buyer gets when he is moved from position j + 1 to position j. That being said, when a buyer accepts the offer associated with position j, this does not mean that he will be assigned to position j. Put differently, when we approach buyers, we do not offer them a particular position; instead, we offer them an (extra) expected number of clicks. This allows us to run the SPMs in parallel or sequentially in an arbitrary order, as the SPMs for different positions are independent of each other. Because of that, after we run all the SPMs, we may have a buyer i who accepted two offers, one for position 1 and one for position 3. This implies that in this SPM for the PA setting, the buyer obtains an expected clicks of (α 1 − α 2 ) + (α 3 − α 4 ) at the expected price of p 1
It is clear that the mechanism is truthful, in the sense that when each buyer i is approached for the j-unit auction at price p j i , he accepts the offer when his value-per-click v i is greater than or equal to p j i . This is so because (i) when v i ≥ p j i , the extra utility that the buyer enjoys from accepting the offer, i.e., (α j − α j+1 )(v i − p j i ), is non-negative and vice versa, and (ii) accepting or rejecting an offer does not influence other offers.
Next, we show that (x 1 (v), . . . ,x n (v)), defined in (9) is a valid vector of expected clicks, in the sense that it satisfies the feasibility conditions in (7). Recall that the feasibility conditions in (7) are necessary and sufficient to have a randomized allocation y(v) ∈ [0, 1] |A| such that for any
Lemma 10 (Feasibility of Expected Clicks in the SPM for PA Settings). Suppose that for any
satisfy the feasibility conditions in (7).
Proof. Proof of Lemma 10 For any subset S ⊆ [n], we have
where the inequality holds because i∈[n] x j i ≤ j. The above equation verifies Condition (7) and completes the proof.
We now present the approximation factor for our SPM.
Theorem 11 (Revenue Bound of our SPM in PA Settings). Our SPM for PA Settings defined above is a j∈[n] (8), are the fraction of the optimal revenue attributed to position j, and LP-SPM(j) is defined in Theorem 4.
Proof. Proof of Theorem 11 Let (x i (·), π i (·)), i ∈ [n], represent the expected number clicks and payment in the optimal PA mechanism and let (x i (·),π i (·)), i ∈ [n], be the expected number clicks and payment in our SPM for the PA settings. Finally, for j, i ∈ [n], let (x j i (·), π j i (·)), and (x j i (·),π j i (·)) be their respective decompositions in terms of multi-unit auctions; see Lemma 9 and Equation (9). Then, we have
where the inequality follows from Theorem 4, which provides an approximation factor for the SPM in the j-unit setting, and the last equation holds because of the definition of f j , given in Equation (8).
Partition Matroids and General Matroids
We refer the reader to Appendix E for results on partition matroids and general matroids. Essentially the approximation factor for H-units setting carries over to the partition matroid setting, while we use Yan's technique to obtain another proof for a 1 − 1/e approximation for general matroids using our SPMs.
A Expanded Related Work
Our work relates and contributes to the literature on optimal auction design. The seminal work of Myerson (1981) shows that when buyers' value distributions are regular and homogeneous, the optimal mechanism can be implemented via a second price auction with reserve. However, the structure of the optimal mechanism can be complex when the value distributions are heterogeneous and irregular (Myerson 1981) . Because of this, several papers have studied simpler auction formats, such as second price auctions with (personalized) reserve prices (Hartline and Roughgarden (2009) , Paes Leme et al. (2016), Roughgarden and Wang (2016) , and Allouah and Besbes (2018)), boosted second price auctions (Golrezaei et al. 2017) , the BIN-TAC mechanism (Celis et al. 2014) , and first price auctions (Bhalgat et al. 2012) , to name a few. Hartline and Roughgarden (2009) study the question of approximating the optimal revenue via a second price auction with personalized reserve prices, and show that for regular distributions, the second price auction with so-called monopoly reserve prices yields a 2-approximation for regular distributions, and that for irregular distributions, no constant factor approximation is possible with the monopoly reserves. Paes Leme et al. (2016) consider second price auctions and study the question of computing the optimal personalized reserve prices in a correlated distribution setting, and they show that the problem is NP-complete. Roughgarden and Wang (2016) show that this problem is APX-hard for correlated distributions and give a 1 2 -approximation. Finally, Golrezaei et al. (2017) -using empirical and theoretical analyses-show that when buyers are heterogeneous, their proposed mechanism, called boosted second price auction, gets a high fraction (more than 1 2 ) of the optimal revenue and outperforms the second price auction with reserve. In the current work, we provide an improved approximation factor for second price auctions and show that this auction format, despite its simple structure, performs well, even when the distributions are heterogeneous and irregular.
Our work is also related to the literature on prophet inequalities Sucheston (1977, 1978) and Kennedy (1987) ). Specifically, studying posted price mechanisms has been intimately connected to the work on prophet inequalities. In the classic prophet inequality setting, n independent (but not necessarily identical) random variables arrive in an adversarial sequence, and after each random variable arrives, the gambler faces two choices: accept the random variable and stop, or reject and continue. The objective is to maximize the expected value of the random variable selected by the gambler. Performance is measured based on the ratio of the gambler's choice to the expected value of the maximum of n random variables (the objective that a prophet with complete foresight can obtain).
Adversarial Prophets: Hill and Kertz (1981) show that when variables are independent but not identical and their orders are chosen adversarially, the gambler can obtain at least 1 2 of the expected value obtained by a prophet; see also Samuel-Cahn (1984) . 1 This 1 2 -approximation was later used by Chawla et al. (2010a) to give a 1 2 -approximation for the posted prices mechanism when the buyers arrive in an adversarial order. When the random variables are i.i.d. and their orders are adversarial, Hill and Kertz (1982) show that the gambler can obtain at least 1 − 1 e of the prophet's value and also show examples that prove that one cannot obtain a factor beyond 1 1.342 ∼ 0.745. Kertz (1986) later conjecture that 1 1.342 ∼ 0.745 is the best possible approximation.
The first formal proof that one can go beyond 1− 1 e was given by Abolhassani et al. (2017) , who give 0.738 for all n beyond a certain constant n 0 . Simultaneously and independently, Correa et al. (2017) show a 0.745 approximation for this problem, thereby completely closing the gap. We highlight that the 0.745 approximation factor proved by Correa et al. (2017) is not applicable to our setting, as in our work, the values of buyers are not i.i.d.
Free-Order Prophets: In another variation of prophet inequalities, the gambler can pick the random variables in her desired order. This variation is known as free-order prophets. In this problem, there are n independent random variables X i with known distributions G i . A decision maker knows the distributions but not the realizations and he chooses an order to inspect the variables. Upon inspecting a variable, he learns its realized value and needs to choose between stopping and obtaining its value as a reward or abandoning that variable forever and continuing to inspect other variables. An algorithm for this problem is a policy that determines an order to inspect the variables and for each variable inspected decides whether to stop and obtain that reward or continue inspecting. If I is the index of the random variable chosen by the decision maker, the performance of the algorithm is E[X I ]. The goal is to compare the performance of the decision maker with a prophet that knows all the values in advance and therefore can obtain E[max(X 1 , . . . , X n )]. Correa et al. (2019a) recently showed that this problem is equivalent to the sequential posted prices problem. In particular, each variable X i in the free-order prophet problem can be mapped to a buyer i with value v i such that the virtual value associated with v i has distribution G i . Then, they showed that one can solve the sequential posted prices problem for v i 's and then map the policy back to a free-order prophet policy. Using this mapping, any algorithm for sequential posted prices can be transformed (in a black-box manner) to an algorithm for the free-order prophets problem with the same approximation ratio. In light of this, the upper bound of 0.745 on the best possible approximation by Kertz (1986) also holds for the SPM setting. Chawla et al. (2010a) give a 1 − 1 e approximation for the SPM problem. Recall that under SPMs, the seller approaches the buyers in decreasing order of their prices. The bound of 1 − 1 e was recently surpassed by Azar et al. (2018) to 1 − 1 e + 0.0025, and their bound also extends to random order prophets, in which the random variables arrive in a uniformly random order (earlier a 1 − 1/e approximation was shown for the random order prophets by and generalized to many settings by Ehsani et al. (2018) ). Correa et al. (2019b) obtain improved approximation factor for both the free order prophet and random order prophets problem, obtaining a 0.669 approximation factor. Further, they show that for the random order prophets problem it is not possible to obtain more than a √ 3 − 1 = 0.732 approximation, thus separating it from the 0.745 approximation obtainable for the i.i.d. case (see Correa et al. (2017) ).
Posted Prices, Prophet Inequalities and Generalizations: The connection between prophet inequalities and mechanism design was initiated by Hajiaghayi et al. (2007) , who interpret the prophet inequality algorithms as truthful mechanisms for online auctions. Chawla et al. (2007) give a 4-approximation to the single-agent n-items unit-demand pricing problem, via upper bounding the revenue of the multi-parameter setting by that of the single-item n-buyers singleparameter problem. Chawla et al. (2010a,b) further this connection, and develop constant fraction approximations for several multi-parameter unit-demand settings, by establishing constant factor approximations to the corresponding single-parameter posted price settings through connections to prophet inequalities. Yan (2011) makes a connection between the revenue of SPMs and correlation gap for submodular functions (Agrawal et al. 2012) . Chakraborty et al. (2010) develop a PTAS for computing the optimal adaptive and non-adaptive SPMs in a k-item single-parameter setting. Kleinberg and Weinberg (2012) generalize the prophet inequalities result to the matroidal setting, and use this to give improved approximations for the multi-parameter unit-demand mechanism design problem. For other generalizations of posted prices and prophet inequalities to combinatorial settings, see Dütting and Kleinberg (2015) , Ehsani et al. (2018) , Feldman et al. (2015) , Rubinstein and Singla (2017) , and Dütting et al. (2017) .
Multi-unit and Matroid Settings: When the permitted set of buyers that can simultaneously get allocated forms an independent set of a H-uniform matroid (the case discussed earlier is that of a 1-uniform matroid) or that of a partition matroid, the original result of Chawla et al. (2010a) shows a 1 − 1/e approximation to the optimal revenue via SPM. Further, when the permitted set of items forms an independent set of a general matroid, Chawla et al. (2010a) show a 1/2 approximation to optimal revenue. Yan (2011) improves results for H-uniform matroids to a 1 − H H H!e H approximation, and improves results for general matroids to a 1 − 1/e approximation. Both these improvements are obtained by connecting the approximation factor of SPMs to that of correlation gap of submodular functions. Our technique for pricing improves the results for H-uniform matroids further beyond 1 − H H H!e H , and our improvement is the first that goes beyond what is obtained by a direct reduction to correlation gap for any H > 1.
B Taxation Principle
The following lemma describes the taxation principle in any deterministic truthful mechanism. We do not prove it here: its proof can be derived from any standard auction theory textbook.
Lemma 12 (Taxation Principle). Given a deterministic truthful mechanism M in any one-dimensional private-value setting with arbitrary feasibility constraints (including single-unit, multi-units, matroids, position auctions), there are threshold functions t i (v −i ) for each buyer i, depending only on the bids of the other buyers v −i = (v j ) j =i , such that the allocation and payment of mechanism M can be described as follows:
• if v i > t i (v −i ), then the buyer i is allocated and he is charged the threshold t i (v −i ).
• if v i = t i (v −i ), then either the buyer i is allocated and charged t i (v −i ), or i is not allocated and not charged.
, then the buyer i is not allocated and not charged.
We note that the threshold functions t i 's can be computed for any deterministic incentivecompatible mechanism. In such a mechanism, each buyer i has a critical value v min -which only depends on other buyers' values-such that he gets allocated and pays v min if his value v i > v min . When v i < v min , he does not get allocated and pays 0. When v i = v min , the mechanism can either allocate an item to buyer i and charge him v min , or not allocate any item to him and charge 0. The threshold function is defined as t i (v −i ) = v min . We give an example to illustrate how these thresholds are computed.
Example 13 (Optimal auction with 1-unit and uniform distributions). Suppose that there are two buyers with values v 1 and v 2 drawn independently from the uniform distributions in [0,1] and [0,2], respectively. In the optimal auction, the item is allocated to the buyer with the highest nonnegative virtual value. 2 The virtual values of buyers 1 and 2 are respectively 2v 1 − 1 and 2v 2 − 2. Thus, buyer 1 is allocated when v 1 ≥ max(0.5, v 2 − 0.5), and buyer 2 is allocated when v 2 ≥ max(1, v 1 + 0.5). Therefore, the threshold functions are given by t 1 (v 2 ) = max(0.5, v 2 − 0.5) and t 2 (v 1 ) = max(1, v 1 + 0.5).
Thresholds, t i (v −i ), are constructed in such a way that the set of buyers with value strictly above thresholds can always be simultaneously allocated without violating any feasibility constraints (for example, in the H-units setting, at most H buyers strictly exceed their thresholds). However, it is possible that the set of buyers who weakly exceed their threshold cannot all be simultaneously allocated (for example, in the H-units setting more than H buyers could weakly exceed their thresholds). In such a case a tie-breaking rule needs to be determined to exactly describe the allocation rule of the mechanism.
There are two important cases in which the issues of tie breaking can be ignored. The first case is when the value distributions are independent and continuous, with no atoms: in this case, the probability that v i = t i (v −i ) is zero. The second case is when the distributions have a finite discrete support: here, the thresholds for any deterministic auction can be constructed in such a way that the set of buyers with value weakly exceeding their threshold, i.e., the set of buyers with v i ≥ t i (v −i ), can always be simultaneously allocated and each allocated buyer pays his threshold, thus there is no need to break ties. In light of this, we note that our results hold for any continuous probability measures and discrete probability measures with a finite support.
C Appendix to Section 3
In this section, to highlight the dependency of our bounds on the number of buyers n, we denote the revenue of SPMs with vector of prices p = (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n ) by SPM n (p). We further denote the optimal revenue by Opt n .
The following theorem is the main result of this section.
Theorem 14 (SPM with a Finite Number of Buyers). There exist reserve prices p = (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n ) such that SPM n (p) ≥ Opt n · max k ( 1 LP-SPM(n,k) ), where for every positive integer k, we have
(LP-SPM-n)
Here, s i = i/k, i ∈ [k], and q n (y) = 1 − y n n .
In the following table, we present the value of LP-SPM(n, k) for different values of n and k.
1 LP-SPM(n,k) is a valid approximation factor for every k. As it becomes clear in the proof, parameter k determines the precision of our discretization. Larger values of k imply more granular discretization. Before presenting the proof of Theorem 14, we briefly discuss LP-SPM-n. Recall that by Equation (1), the optimal revenue is ∞ 0 s(τ )dτ , where s(τ ) is the probability that the optimal auction sells at a price of at least τ . We define 0
The proof shows that w i,Opt , i ∈ [n], is a feasible solution to LP-SPM-n, and as a result, the objective function of Problem LP-SPM-n provides an upper bound on the optimal revenue. Next, we prove Theorem 14 by verifying that w i,Opt , i ∈ [n], satisfies the constraints of LP-SPM-n.
Proof of Theorem 14. Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, we consider the posted price mechanism that chooses the best of Myersonian and uniform pricing rules. We then show that the revenue of this mechanism is at least a max k ( 1 LP-SPM(n,k) ) fraction of the optimal revenue, where LP-SPM(n, k) is defined in Theorem 14.
We show that w i,Opt 's, defined in (20), is a feasible solution of Problem LP-SPM-n. This implies that the objective function of Problem LP-SPM-n provides an upper bound on the optimal revenue. In addition, without loss of generality, we normalize the revenue of the posted price mechanism that chooses the best of Myersonian and uniform pricing rules to one; that is, max(MP, UP) = 1.
To show the result, we will verify that w i,Opt 's satisfy the constraints of Problem LP-SPM-n. First Set of Constraints: Here, we show that w i,Opt 's satisfy the first set of constraints. Define T x = inf{τ : s(τ ) ≤ x}, x ∈ [0, 1]. In addition, with a slight abuse of notation, let UP x be the revenue of the posted price mechanism that posts a uniform price of T x for all buyers. By definition of the uniform posted price mechanism, we have UP ≥ max x∈[0,1] UP x . Then, by Inequality (23), and our assumption that max(MP, UP) = 1, we have
In the following, we set x to s j = j/k. Then, we get
where the first inequality follows from the monotonicity of s(·) and the definitions of τ i 's and T x and the second inequality follows from the definition of w i,Opt and the fact that s(·) is weakly decreasing. Note that the above equation verifies the first set of constraints.
Second Constraint: Here, we show that w i,Opt 's satisfy the second set of constraints. Let m(τ ) be the probability that the Myersonian posted price mechanism sells with a price of at least τ . Then, by construction of the prices, t i 's, in this mechanism, we have m(τ ) = 1 − P[Z τ = 0], where Z τ is the number of buyers who satisfy v i ≥ t i ≥ τ . This implies that
where the second inequality follows from Lemma 15, and third inequality follows from Lemma 16 where we show 1−qn(y) y is decreasing in y. The above equation gives the second constraint, and completes the proof.
where q n (y) = 1 − y n n .
Proof. Define z i = I(v i ≥ t i ≥ τ ), where I(·) is an indicator function. Then, Z τ can be written as follows:
where the first inequality follows from the fact that for any sequence a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n , we have i∈[n] a i ≤ i∈[n] a i n n . By definition of q n (·), the above equation leads to Inequality (11).
Lemma 16. Function y → 1 y (x + 1 − q n (y)) is decreasing in y ∈ [0, 1] for every positive integer n and every x ≥ 0, where q n (y) = (1 − y n ) n . Further, the limiting function is also decreasing, i.e., function y → 1
Proof. The proof follows from taking derivative and showing that it is negative in the desired range. We first show that function y → 1 y (x + 1 − e −y ) is decreasing in y ∈ [x, 1]. Note that,
where the inequality holds because 1 + y ≤ e y and x ≥ 0. We next show that function y → 1 y (x + 1 − q n (y)) is decreasing in y ∈ [x, 1], for every positive integer n and every x ≥ 0, where q n (·) is defined in Theorem 14. The derivative of this function w.r.t. y is given by
To show that ∂ 1 y (x+1−qn(y)) ∂y ≤ 0, we verify that − x+1
(1− y n ) n−1 + y + 1 − y n ≤ 0. For y < 1 and x ≥ 0, we have
The last inequality implies that 1 y (x + 1 − q n (y)) is decreasing in y. 
Proof. Let y be the number of buyers with
Recall that m(τ ) is expected number of units that the SPM with Myersonian prices sells with a price of at least τ . Then,
Given this, we start with writing H−1
In the proof, to simplify the notation, we denote s(τ ) and s i (τ ), i ∈ [n], with s and s i , respectively. Define polynomial P n (s 1 , . . . , s n ) := H−1 i=0 (H − i)P[y = i]. We find an upper bound on P n (s 1 , . . . , s n ). By definition, P n (s 1 , . . . , s n ) is equal to:
We show that subject to i∈[n] s i = s, the value of the polynomial P n is maximized when s 1 = s 2 = . . . = s n = s/n. This completes the proof.
To show this, consider a point s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) such that i∈[n] s i = s. Pick any pair of coordinates (without loss of generality, 1 and 2) and consider increasing one and decreasing the other. We show that P n (s 1 + δ, s 2 − δ, s 3 , . . . , s n ) − P n (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n )
is quadratic in δ and the quadratic coefficient is negative. Then, considering the fact that P n is symmetric, it follows that the maximum in this direction is achieved at δ such that s 1 + δ = s 2 − δ, i.e., when the two coordinates are equal. Since this argument holds for any pair of coordinates, it follows that the polynomial is maximized when all the coordinates are equal, i.e., s i = s/n for i ∈ [n]. Note than each term of polynomial P n (s 1 , . . . , s n ) is either a product of s i , i ∈ [n], or a product of (1 − s i ). For a given term in (13), we say s i , i ∈ [n], is in the first "location" if this term is a product of s i and we say s i is in the second location if this term is a product of 1 − s i . Then, we group the terms in expression (13) based on the locations of s i for i ∈ [n] − {1, 2}; that is, we put all the terms with the same location for all i ∈ [n] − {1, 2} in the same group. Now, consider a certain group. Note that any term in this group can be written as a product of i∈Loc 1 s i j∈Loc 2 (1 − s j ) for i, j = 1, 2, where Loc 1 and Loc 2 are respectively the subsets of indices that are in the first and second locations for the aforementioned group. Specifically, Loc 2 = [n] − (Loc 1 ∪ {1, 2}). Let us call this i∈Loc 1 s i j∈Loc 2 (1 − s j ) a common sub-term of the group. We are interested in multiplier of the common sub-term in P n (s 1 + δ, s 2 − δ, s 3 , . . . , s n ) − P n (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n ). We will show that the multiplier of the common sub-term in P n (s 1 + δ, s 2 − δ, s 3 , . . . , s n ) − P n (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n ) is always zero unless L := |Loc 1 | = H − 1. We further show that any non-zero multiplier of the common sub-term is quadratic and concave in δ.
We consider the following three cases.
• Case 1 (L ≤ H − 3): The multiplier of the common sub-term in P n (s 1 + δ, s 2 − δ, s 3 , . . . , s n ) − P n (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n ) depends on the location of s 1 and s 2 in P n . Thus, the group associated with the common sub-term has four members where each member corresponds to one particular location for s 1 and s 2 . We consider each of these members separately.
-Member 1: Both s 1 and s 2 are in the first location. In that case, the multiplier of the common sub-term is
The multiplier (H − (L + 2)) is due to the fact that the number s i 's, i ∈ [n], that are in the first location is |Loc 1 | + 2 = L + 2.
-Member 2: Both s 1 and s 2 are in the second location. In that case, the multiplier of the common sub-term is
-Members 3 and 4: One of s i , i ∈ {1, 2} is the first location and the other one is in the second location. In that case, the multiplier of the common sub-term is
Putting all these together, it is easy to see that the multiplier of the common sub-term with |Loc 1 | ≤ H − 3 is zero.
• Case 2: (L = H − 2): Here, the group associated with the common sub-term has three members. Note that both s 1 and s 2 cannot be in the first location as the number of s i 's in the first location cannot exceed H − 1.
-Member 1: Both s 1 and s 2 are in the second location. In that case, the multiplier of the common sub-term is
where the last equality follows because L = H − 2.
-Members 2 and 3: One of s i , i ∈ {1, 2} is the first location and the other one is in the second location. In that case, by Equation (15), the multiplier of the common sub-term is 2(H − (L + 1)) δs 1 − δs 2 + δ 2 = 2 δs 1 − δs 2 + δ 2 ,
where the equation holds because L = H − 2.
Considering this, it is easy to see that the multiplier of the common sub-term with |Loc 1 | = H − 2 is zero.
• Case 3: L = H − 1: In this case, the group has only one member for which both s 1 and s 2 are in the second location. Thus, by Equation (14), the coefficient of the common multiplier is −δs 1 + δs 2 − δ 2 . Observe that this term is quadratic and concave in δ. This observation completes the proof.
D.2 Proof of Theorem 4
Theorem 4 (Revenue Bound in Multi-unit Settings).
In a H-units n-buyers auction with independent buyer valuations, there exists a vector of prices p = (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n ) such that SPM H (p) ≥ Opt H LP-SPM(H) , where Opt H is the expected optimal revenue in a H-units setting, SPM H (p) is the expected revenue of a posted price mechanism with prices of p, and LP-SPM(H) is defined as
is weakly decreasing .
(LP-SPM(H))
. Furthermore, our bound is greater than the best-known bound prior to this work. That is,
Proof. Proof of Theorem 4 In the first part of the proof, we show that the SPM with the best of the Myersonian and uniform prices in a multi-unit setting with H units give us the desired bound.
In the second part of the proof, we show that our bound outperforms the best-known bound prior to this work. First Part (Showing the Bound): We start by revisiting the definition of Myersonian and uniform prices for the SPM.
Myersonian Posted Price Mechanism: Approach the buyers in decreasing order of their Myersonian posted prices, i.e., the re-sampled thresholds t i (defined in Section 2.2), and allocate to the first H buyers whose values v i exceeds their threshold t i . With a slight abuse of notation, let MP denote the expected revenue of this mechanism, where the expectation is taken w.r.t. the randomness in both the re-sampled posted prices and the buyers' values.
Uniform Posted Price Mechanism: Approach buyers in an arbitrary order, and allocate to the first H buyers whose value exceeds the price p = arg max
where v (i) is the i-th highest value. Equivalently, p = arg max p p · E[min(|S p |, H)] where S p is the set of buyers with v i ≥ p. With a slight abuse of notation, let UP be the expected revenue of this mechanism, where the expectation is taken with respect to the buyers' values.
We show that max(MP, UP) ≥ 1 LP-SPM(H) Opt H . Without loss of generality, assume that the revenue of the posted price mechanism that chooses the best of uniform and Myersonian prices is normalized to 1: i.e., max(MP, UP) = 1. The proof shows that the function s(·) corresponding to the optimal Myerson solution of a properly scaled problem (see Equation (1)) is a feasible solution to Problem LP-SPM(H). This implies that the objective function of LP-SPM(H) is an upper bound on the optimal revenue. Thus, proving that s(·) satisfies the constraints of Problem LP-SPM(H) along with our assumption that max(MP, UP) = 1 will imply that max(MP, UP) ≥ 1 LP-SPM(H) Opt. The last set of constraints, i.e., the monotonicity condition, is obviously satisfied by s(·). Thus, we focus on the first and second sets of constraints.
Upper Bounds on UP (First Set of Constraints): By Lemma 3, it is clear that s(·) satisfies the first set of constraints. The lemma, indeed, presented an upper bound on UP.
Lower Bounds on MP (Second Constraint): Let m i (τ ) be the probability that v i ≥ t i ≥ τ . Then, we define m(τ ) = n i=1 m i (τ ) as the expected number of units that the Myersonian posted price mechanism sells with a price of at least τ . This gives us
where the inequality follows from max(MP, UP) = 1. Next, we present a lower bound on MP. Let y be the number of buyers with
This leads to
Invoking Lemma 5, we get
Second Part (Beating the Best-Known Bound):
We first invoke Lemma 6 to write LP-SPM(H) as follows: 1 + ln(Hτ ), where τ * > 1 H is the unique solution of the following equation: 
Having simplified the summations, we now revisit Equation (18):
Note that the integral in the l.h.s. of the above equation is positive. This implies that ln(Hτ * ) < H H H!e H , which is the desired result.
D.3 Proof of Lemma 6
Lemma 6 (Characterizing LP-SPM(H)). Consider any positive integer H > 1. Let τ * > 1 H be the unique solution of the following equation:
Proof. Proof of Lemma 6 Since by the last set of constraints of Problem LP-SPM(H) σ(τ ) is (weakly) decreasing in τ and f H (σ(τ )) is decreasing in σ(τ ) (see Lemma 7), function f H (τ ) is increasing in τ . Thus, the optimal solution of Problem LP-SPM(H) must satisfy that σ(τ ) = min(H, 1/τ ) whenever τ ≤ τ and σ(τ ) = 0 when τ > τ . Here, τ > 1 is the unique threshold for which ∞ 0 σ(τ )f (min(H, 1/τ ))dτ = 1. Hence, the optimal solution of Problem LP-SPM(H) has the following form:
Considering that
Then, the optimal solution of Problem LP-SPM(H) is given by 1 + ln(Hτ ). This is so because 
D.4 Proof of Lemma 7
Lemma 7 (f H (x) is Monotone). For any positive integer H, function f H (x) =
Proof. Proof of Lemma 7 The plan is to take derivative of f H (x) w.r.t. x and show the derivative is non-positive. f H (x) is given by:
By linearity of differentiation, the derivative of f H (·) is the sum of derivative of
Therefore, the derivative of f H (x) w.r.t. x is given by
The derivative being non-positive is equivalent to
We break the sum on the l.h.s. into more manageable terms. Note that
We find the value of each of the four terms in the r.h.s. separately. The idea is to take advantage of telescopic sums. For the first term, we have
For the second term, we have
For the third term, we have
And, finally, for the fourth term we have
Putting everything together, we get
Note that by the Taylor expansion, e x = ∞ i=0
x i i! . Therefore,
This concludes the proof; see Equation (19).
E Appendix to Section 5 E.1 Proof of Lemma 9
Proof. Proof of Lemma 9 As stated earlier, for any buyer i, there is J i such that x j i (v) = 0 for 1 ≤ j < J i and x j i (v) = 1 for J i ≤ j ≤ n. (When buyer i is not allocated in any of the n multi-unit auctions, we set J i to n + 1.) In that case, j∈[n] (α j − α j+1 )x j i (v) = α J i , which is the click-through-rate of position J i . Now, consider the optimal Myerson auction in the PA setting. In this auction, positions are assigned in a decreasing order of buyers' (ironed) virtual values. That is, the first position is allocated to the buyer with the highest non-negative virtual value, the second position is allocated to the buyer with the second highest non-negative (ironed) virtual value, and so on. This means that in the optimal auction, position J i should get allocated to buyer i, as buyer i has the J i -th highest virtual value. Regarding the payment, we note that the payment rule in Myerson auction is a linear function of the allocation rule. Considering this and the fact that
E.2 Partition Matroid Settings
The partition matroid feasibility constraint is defined by a partition of the set of buyers [n] into [n] = S 1 ∪ S 2 ∪ · · · ∪ S k that is publicly available, and from each set S i at most H i buyers are allowed to be allocated. As stated in the introduction, such feasibility constraints could arise from legal/policy restrictions that prevent more than H i buyers from geographical region i from receiving an allocation for example. The definition of SPM is provided in Section 2 for general matroids. In particular, the SPM mechanism for a partition matroid is equivalent (i.e., results in the same allocation and buyer-wise payment) to running the H i -units SPM mechanism independently for each set S i . Thus, if in every single set S i , the SPM mechanism for that set of buyers manages to get at least an α fraction of Opt H i for that set, it follows that the SPM mechanism obtains at least an α fraction of the global Opt M for the partition matroid, where Opt M = i Opt H i . Here, Opt H i is the optimal revenue with H i units and set of buyers S i . Thus, the SPM approximation factor for partition matroids strictly
, and matches the numbers in Table 2 for the smallest H i . This is so because our bounds for the multi-unit setting is universal and does not depend on the number of buyers and valuation distributions.
As for SPMs, just like in the multi-units setting, we choose between Myersonian posted price (MP) and Uniform posted price (UP) to get the better expected revenue yielding mechanism while picking our prices, we do the same on a per set basis here. That is, for each set S i , we choose between MP and UP based on revenue to pick the prices for that set. It is immediate to see that the SPM approximation factor for partition matroids strictly exceeds min i (1 − H H i i H i !e H i ) and matches the numbers in Table 2 for the smallest H i .
E.3 Matroid Settings
A matroid M(E, I) comprises a ground set of elements E and a non-empty collection I ⊆ 2 E of independent sets. Matroid M(E, I) satisfies the following two conditions. (i) If set T ∈ I, then any subset of T is also in I. (ii) Given S, T ∈ I with |S| < |T | and element e ∈ T \S, we have S ∪ {e} ∈ I. For our purpose, the ground set is the set of buyers, i.e., E = [n] and I = F, i.e., I consists of all the feasible allocations. In particular, T / ∈ I implies that set T of the buyers cannot be allocated simultaneously. Note that the single-unit and multi-unit settings are special cases of the matroidal feasibility constraint.
From the techniques of Yan (2011) , it follows that our Myersonian posted price mechanism already obtains a 1 − 1/e approximation to Opt M . Yan establishes that the expected revenue of the optimal mechanism (Myerson's mechanism) is upper bounded by E W [f (W )] where W is the set of winners in the optimal mechanism and f (·) is the weighted matroid rank function, which happens to be a monotone submodular function. Yan also shows that the revenue of any posted price mechanism (including our Myersonian posted price mechanism) is E S [f (S)] where S is the set of buyers that exceed their posted prices, and f (·) is the same weighted matroid rank function. The commonality between S and W is that if a buyer i is an element of W with probability q i , the buyer i is an element of S with the same probability q i -this follows from how the thresholds in the Myersonian posted prices are constructed from the Myerson's mechanism itself using the taxation principle. The difference between S and W is that the elements of S are independently chosen (recall that we resample other buyers' values when choosing the threshold for each buyer), whereas the elements of W are correlated. A beautiful result about submodular functions (Agrawal et al. 2010 , Vondrák 2007 ) says that the correlation gap of submodular functions is at most e e−1 . In other words,
where D is an arbitrary joint distribution over the ground set of elements over which the submodular function f (·) is defined, and I(D) is an independent distribution over the ground set with the same marginals as D. This immediately shows that our Myersonian posted price mechanism obtains at least a 1 − 1 e fraction of Opt M , proving Proposition 17. Proposition 17 (Revenue Bound in General Matroid Settings). In a n-buyers setting with independent buyer valuations and matroidal feasibility constraints, the Myersonian posted price mechanism obtains a revenue of at least (1 − 1 e ) · Opt M .
F Eager Second Price Auctions ESP M (p)
In this section we illustrate how our techniques generalize to analyze the eager second price auction, ESP M (p) and result in strictly improved approximation factor for ESP when compared to SPMs. We study selling a single item via ESP M (p) for arbitrary number of buyers and small number of buyers. The eager second price auction for selling a single item works as follow:
-Each buyer i ∈ [n] submits his bid, which is equal to his value v i .
-All the buyers with value v i < p i are first eliminated. Let S = {i : v i ≥ p i } be the set of all the buyers who clear their reserve prices.
-The item is then allocated to the set S of buyers where S = arg max S ⊆S,S ∈F i∈S v i . Let S −i denote the set of allocated buyers when the original set of buyers is just [n] \ {i}. Each buyer i in S pays max(p i , j∈S −i v j − j =i,j∈S v j ). Buyers who are not in S pay 0.
F.1 Eager Second Price Auctions for Arbitrary Number of Buyers
The bound presented in Theorem 1 is also a valid bound for ESP auctions. However, ESP auctions can potentially earn higher revenue than SPMs by leveraging the second highest bid. We now show how to exploit the second highest bid to obtain an improved bound for ESP auctions.
Theorem 18 (Revenue Bound of ESP). In a single-unit n-buyers auction with independent buyer valuations, there exists a vector of prices p = (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n ) such that ESP(p) ≥ 0.6620 · Opt, where Opt is the expected optimal revenue and ESP(p) is the expected revenue of an eager second price auction with personalized reserve prices of p.
Proof of Theorem 18
The proof is similar to that of Theorem 1 in spirit. We consider an ESP auction that chooses the best of Myersonian and uniform reserve prices. We construct a factor revealing LP to bound its performance. Myersonian ESP Auction: We run the ESP auction with personalized reserve prices for each buyer, with buyer i facing the re-sampled threshold t i as his reserve price (see the definition in Section 2.2). Let ME denote the expected revenue of this auction.
Uniform ESP Auction: We run the ESP auction with a uniform reserve price of
is the second highest bid (which is also equal to the second highest value in a truthful auction). We denote the revenue of this auction by UE.
In the following claim, we show that the best of the two aforementioned ESP auctions has the approximation factor given in Theorem 18, concluding its proof.
Claim 19 (Detailed Statement of Theorem 18). For every positive integer k, the maximum of the Myersonian ESP auction's and uniform ESP auction's revenue is at least
and s i = i/k, for i ∈ [k]. In particular, setting k = 3200, the approximation factor is 1 LP-ESP(3200) = 0.6620.
The factor revealing LP, given in Claim 19, does not have a closed-form solution. In the following table, we present the value of LP-ESP(k) for different values of k. Since 1 LP-ESP(k) is a valid approximation factor for every k, it follows that 1 LP-ESP(3200) = 0.6620 is a valid approximation factor. As it becomes clear in the proof, parameter k determines the precision of our discretization. Larger values of k imply more granular discretization. Before presenting the proof of Claim 19, we briefly discuss LP-ESP. Recall that by Equation (1), the optimal revenue is ∞ 0 s(τ )dτ , where s(τ ) is the probability that the optimal auction sells at a price of at least τ . We define 0
The proof shows that w i,Opt , i ∈ [n], is a feasible solution to LP-ESP, and as a result, the objective function of Problem LP-ESP provides an upper bound on the optimal revenue. Next, we show Claim 19 by verifying that w i,Opt , i ∈ [n], satisfies the constraints of LP-ESP.
Proof. Proof of Claim 19 The goal is to show that max(UE, ME) ≥ 1 LP-ESP(k) · Opt. Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, without loss of generality, let max(UE, ME) = 1. As stated earlier, the objective function of Problem LP-ESP provides an upper bound on Opt if we show that w i,Opt , i ∈ [n] is a feasible solution to Problem LP-ESP.
First Set of Constraints: Here, we show that w i,Opt , i ∈ [n], satisfies the first set of constraints. Let T x = inf{τ : s(τ ) ≤ x}, x ∈ [0, 1]. In addition, with a slight abuse of notation, let UE x be the revenue of the ESP auction that posts a uniform price of T x for all buyers. By definition of the uniform ESP auction, we have UE = max x∈[0,1] UE x . We now bound ME + UE x for any x ∈ [0, 1].
We start by bounding UE x . Define u x (τ ) as the probability that the ESP auction with uniform price T x sells with a price of at least τ . Then,
This bound holds because (i) while the ESP auction with uniform price T x can sell the item with a price of at least τ if there exists at least one buyer i with value v i ≥ T x , the optimal auction can sell at a price of at least T x only if there is at least one buyer i with For τ > T x , we bound u x (τ ) by noting that the ESP auction with uniform price T x can sell at a price of at least τ only if there are at least two buyers bidding above τ . Let Z τ be the cardinality of set {i ∈ [n], v i ≥ τ } and Z τ be the cardinality of set {i ∈ [n], v i ≥ t i ≥ τ }.
Then, we have:
Combining the bounds in (21) and (22), we get
We next bound ME. With a slight abuse of notation, let m(τ ) be the probability that the Myersonian ESP auction sells at a price greater than or equal to τ . Then, by the definition of Z τ , we have
Then, considering that ME = ∞ τ =0 m(τ )dτ and by using Inequalities (23) and (24), we get
where the first inequality follows from our assumption that max(ME, UE) = 1. To simplify the r.h.s. of (25), we make use of Lemma 20, stated at the end of this section, which says P[Z τ = 0] ≤ e −s(τ ) , and 2P[Z τ = 0] + P[Z τ = 1] ≤ (2 + s(τ ))e −s(τ ) . By Equation (25) and Lemma 15, we get
The above equation holds for any x ∈ [0, 1]. Set x = j/k. Then, we have
where the equality follows from the definitions of τ j 's and T x and the fact that at x = j/k, T x = τ j . The second inequality follows from the definitions of w i,Opt 's and s i 's and the facts that y → 1 y (2 − (2 + y)e −y ) and y → 1 y (x + 1 − e −y ) are decreasing in y ∈ [0, 1] (for proof, see Lemma 16, which is stated at the end of this section) and that s(τ ) itself is a decreasing function. Then, since x = s j = j/k, Inequality (27) shows that w i,Opt 's satisfy the first set of constraints in Problem LP-ESP.
The Second Constraint: Here, we show that w i,Opt , i ∈ [n], satisfies the second set of constraints. We now apply the same procedure to bound ME = ∞ τ =0 m(τ )dτ . By Inequality (24), Lemma 20, and the fact that max(ME, UE) = 1, we have
which shows that w i,Opt 's satisfy the second set of constraints in Problem LP-ESP.
Lemma 20. Let Z τ be the number of buyers with v i ≥ t i ≥ τ ; that is, Z τ = {i ∈ [n], v i ≥ t i ≥ τ } . Then, P[Z τ = 0] ≤ q n (s(τ )) ≤ lim n→∞ q n (s(τ )) = e −s(τ )
2P[Z τ = 0] + P[Z τ = 1] ≤ r n (s(τ )) ≤ lim n→∞ r n (s(τ )) = (2 + s(τ ))e −s(τ ) ,
where q n (y) = 1 − y n n and r n (y) = 2 1 − y n n + y 1 − y n n−1 .
Proof. Define z i = I(v i ≥ t i ≥ τ ), where I(·) is an indicator function. Then, Z τ can be written as follows: (1−s i (τ )) ≤ 1 − i∈[n] s i (τ ) n n ≤ e − i∈[n] s i (τ ) = e −s(τ ) ,
where the first inequality follows from the fact that for any sequence a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n , we have i∈[n] a i ≤ i∈[n] a i n n . By definition of q n (·), the above equation leads to Inequality (28), which is the first desired result. Next, we will show Inequality (29). We start by observing that the l.h.s. of this equation can be written as a symmetric polynomial in s 1 (τ ), . . . , s n (τ ), namely, 2P[Z τ = 0] + P[Z τ = 1] = 2 i∈[n]
(1 − s i (τ )) + i∈ [n] s i (τ ) j =i
(1 − s j (τ )) .
In the rest of the proof, to ease the notation, we denote s i (τ ), i ∈ [n], by s i . Define polynomial P n (s 1 , . . . , s n ) := 2 i∈[n] (1 − s i ) + i∈[n] s i j =i (1 − s j ). To provide an upper bound on 2P[Z τ = 0] + P[Z τ = 1], we show that subject to the constraint i∈[n] s i = s(τ ), the value of the polynomial P n is maximized when s 1 = s 2 = · · · = s n = s(τ )/n.
To prove this, consider a point s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) such that i∈[n] s i = s(τ ). Pick any pair of coordinates (without loss of generality, 1 and 2) and consider increasing one and decreasing the other. Now, note that P (s 1 + δ, s 2 − δ, s 3 , . . . , s n ) is a quadratic function of δ. It is not difficult to verify that the quadratic coefficient is negative. Then, considering the fact that P is symmetric, it follows that the maximum in this direction is achieved at δ such that s 1 + δ = s 2 − δ, i.e., when the two coordinates are equal, for every profile of values for the remaining coordinates. Since this argument holds for any pair of coordinates, it follows that P (s) is maximized when all coordinates are equal, i.e., s i = s(τ )/n for i ∈ [n].
So far, we have established that 2P[Z τ = 0] + P[Z τ = 1] ≤ P n s(τ ) n , . . . , s(τ ) n = r n (s(τ )) ,
where the equality follows from the definitions of P n and r n . The above equation gives us the first desired inequality in (29). For the second inequality, observe that: P n s(τ ) n , . . . , s(τ ) n = P n+1 s(τ ) n , . . . , s(τ ) n , 0 ≤ P n+1 s(τ ) n + 1 , . . . , s(τ ) n + 1 , s(τ ) n + 1 .
In particular, P n s(τ ) n , . . . , s(τ ) n ≤ lim k→∞ P k s(τ ) k , . . . , s(τ ) k = (2 + s(τ ))e −s(τ ) .
Lemma 21. Functions y → 1 y (2 − r n (y)) and y → 1 y (x + 1 − q n (y)) are decreasing in y ∈ [0, 1] for every positive integer n and every x ≥ 0, where q n (y) = (1− y n ) n and r n (y) = 2(1− y n ) n +y(1− y n ) n−1 . In addition, functions y → 1 y (2 − (2 + y)e −y ) and y → 1 y (x + 1 − e −y ) are decreasing in y ∈ [0, 1] and y ∈ [x, 1]. 3
Proof. The proof follows from taking derivatives and showing that they are negative in the desired ranges. We first show that functions y → 1 y (2 − (2 + y)e −y ) and y → 1 y (x + 1 − e −y ) are decreasing respectively in y ∈ [0, 1] and y ∈ [x, 1]. For the first function, note that d 1 y (2−(2+y)e −y ) dy = 1 y 2 (2ye −y + y 2 e −y + 2e −y − 2) ≤ 0 due to the inequality e y ≥ 1 + y + y 2 2 . For the second function,
where the inequality holds because 1 + y ≤ e y and x ≥ 0. We next show that functions y → 1 y (2 − r n (y)) and y → 1 y (x + 1 − q n (y)) are decreasing in y ∈ [0, 1] and y ∈ [x, 1], respectively, for every positive integer n and every x ≥ 0, where q n (·) and r n (·) are defined in Lemma 15. While taking derivatives below, we assume n ≥ 2. It is straightforward to verify for the case of n = 1.
By definition of r n (·), the derivative of the first function is given by d 1 y (2 − r n (y)) dy =
(1 − y n ) n−2 y 2 n−1 n + 2y(1 − y n ) + 2(1 − y n ) 2 − 2 (1− y n ) n−2 y 2 .
3 Note that limn→∞ 1 y (2 − rn(y)) = 1 y (2 − (2 + y)e −y ) and limn→∞ 1 y (x + 1 − qn(y)) = 1 y (x + 1 − e −y ).
Note that the derivative is non-positive if y 2 n − 1 2n + y(1 − y n ) + (1 − y n ) 2 = 1 + n − 2 n y + (n − 1)(n − 2) 2 y 2 n 2 ≤ 1 (1 − y n ) n−2 ,
where the equality follows from a simple algebra. In the following, we will verify the inequality. This shows that 1 y (2 − r n (y)) is decreasing in y. For any y ∈ [0, 1), we have 1 (1 − y n ) n−2 ≥ 1 + y n + y 2 n 2 n−2 ≥ 1 + (n − 2) y n + (n − 2)(n − 3) 2 + (n − 2) y 2 n 2 = 1 + n − 2 n y + (n − 1)(n − 2) 2 y 2 n 2 . The last equation is the desired result.
We next show that function 1 y (x + 1 − q n (y)) is decreasing in y. The derivative of this function w.r.t. y is given by ∂ 1 y (x + 1 − q n (y)) ∂y = −x − 1 + y(1 − y n ) n−1 + (1 − y n ) n y 2 =
(1 − y n ) n−1 − x+1
(1− y n ) n−1 + y + 1 − y n y 2 .
x + 1 (1 − y n ) n−1 ≥ (x + 1) 1 + y n n−1 ≥ (x + 1) 1 + n − 1 n y ≥ 1 + n − 1 n y .
The last inequality implies that 1 y (x + 1 − q n (y)) is decreasing in y.
F.2 Eager Second Price Mechanism for Small Number of Buyers
The following theorem presents our improved bounds for the ESP auction when the number of buyers is n.
Theorem 22 (ESP with a Finite Number of Buyers). There exists a vector of reserve prices p = (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n ) such that ESP n (p) ≥ Opt n · max k ( 1 LP-ESP(n,k) ), where for every positive integer k, we have LP-ESP(n, k) = max
Here, s i = i/k, i ∈ [k], q n (y) = 1 − y n n , and r n (y) = 2 1 − y n n + y 1 − y n n−1 .
The proof of Theorem 22 is similar to the proof of Theorem 18; thus, it is omitted. The only difference between the proofs is that here, we provide tighter lower bounds for the revenue of the Myersonian and uniform ESP auctions using Lemma 20. This lemma provides n-dependent and n-independent bounds. The n-independent bounds, i.e., 2e −s i + s i e −s i and e −s i , were used in Theorem 18, while the n-dependent bounds, i.e., r n (s i ) and q n (s i ), are used in Theorem 22 to obtain an improved approximation factor. Observe that if in Problem LP-ESP-n, we replace r n (s i ) and q n (s i ) respectively with 2e −s i + s i e −s i and e −s i , we can recover Problem LP-ESP.
To better understand Theorem 22, in Table 5 , we present 
